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Abstract 
Traditionally, media like TV and radio, but also the Internet, have been characterized by free 
access (by consumers having the necessary hardware), with services supported through 
advertising revenues. Profitability in these markets depends on the capability of attracting 
audience. Strategic choices, however, also depend on the relationship with the dual market for 
advertising services.  
In this paper, a model is introduced, which has two distinguishing features. First, the 
multidimensional nature of competition in media markets is acknowledged, through explicit 
modeling of vertical and horizontal differentiation. Second, the price of advertising depends on 
the expected audience composition, not simply on its magnitude.  
It also depends on the broadcasters' capability of effectively price-discriminate among 
advertising customers.  
It is found that market equilibria depend on a number of critical factors: the amount and type 
of price discrimination in advertising, the correlation between formats and audience 
composition, the relative profitability of the different market segments, and diseconomies of 
scale in program quality.  
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Traditionally, media like TV and radio, but also the Internet, have been characterized by free access
(by consumers having the necessary hardware), with services supported through advertising
revenues. Although other business models have emerged (e.g., pay-TV, pay-per-view, etc.), this is
still the distinctive market characteristic in many media industries.
Profitability in these markets depends on the capability of attracting audience. Larger audiences
(viewers, listeners, “eyeballs”) affect the value of advertising services, therefore the revenue of TV
or radio stations, or Internet portals. Competitors fight for audience through horizontal and vertical
product differentiation. For example, TV channels make strategic decisions about the format,
scheduling and quality of the programs: the competitive game is, therefore, intrinsically complex
and multidimensional.
Strategic choices, however, also depend on the relationship with the dual market for advertising
services. The view that channels and advertisers aim at maximizing audience is quite simplistic.
Market segmentation is important: advertisers want to know who is the typical viewer of a certain
TV program (Thompson (1989)). Advertisers may want to place their spots inside certain programs,
rather than others. They may also support certain TV productions, because they could have some
cultural influence, suggesting “lifestyles” consistent with the products to be advertised.
Price discrimination in the market for advertising is also important. The law of one price does not
apply if broadcasters may affect the willingness to pay of advertisers through their programming
choices.
In the literature on media market competition, this bilateral relationship between advertising and
media industries is often neglected (see, however, Rosse (1970), Dertouzos and Trautman (1990),
Blair and Romano (1993), Rysman (2004)). Many models simply assume that there exist a constant
return per viewer/listener for the competing channels, so that audience maximization is the main
objective in advertising-supported media industries.
In this paper, a new model is introduced, which has two distinguishing features. First, the
multidimensional nature of competition in media markets is acknowledged, through explicit
modeling of vertical and horizontal differentiation. In the context of horizontal differentiation, it is
recognized that there are, typically, a finite set of alternative “formats” available, for example for
TV programs. Second, the price of advertisement depends on the expected audience composition,
not simply on its magnitude. It also depends on the broadcasters' capability to price-discriminate
effectively among advertising customers.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section illustrates the existing literature on media
market competition, and discusses the relation with the model proposed here. The model structure
2and some results, for various market configurations, are presented in section 3. The following
section discusses the policy implications, possible extensions and limitations of the model. A final
section concludes.
2. Relation with Previous Literature
The literature on media market competition has focused on specific issues. The classic reference is
Steiner (1952), who considered the problem of program duplication in a radio industry with
advertising-based revenues. He found the striking result that monopoly may be superior than
competition, as wasteful program duplication may be avoided.
Steiner's approach, later adopted by other authors (e.g., Beebe (1977)
1, Spence and Owen (1977)
2),
is peculiar because there exist a discrete set of program typologies, and consumer preferences are
mapped to this set. On the other hand, programming may be regarded as an example of product
differentiation, and maximal differentiation should be expected as a natural outcome, since
differentiation allows the achievement of local market power.
The standard approach in the product differentiation literature is based on some variant of
Hotelling's localization model, which considers a continuum space. In a Hotelling duopoly, identical
localization choices emerge if price competition is ruled out. If price, or quality, competition is
considered in a two-stage game, then differentiation is maximal. This would mean, in media
markets like TV or radio, that program duplication would never occur. To restore the duplication
result, two additional hypotheses are needed: (1) that consumer preferences are not uniformly
distributed (concentration of preferences), (2) that localization alternatives are a finite, discrete set.
Although the Steiner modeling approach can be regarded as an example of the latter case, other
authors have recently opted for a more conventional methodology, based on localization in
continuum space. This provides two main advantages. First, calculus can be used, instead of more
complex combinatorial methods. Second, a richer array of consumer characteristics and competition
instruments can be considered.
For instance, Papandrea (1997) uses a Salop-like model of monopolistic competition, in which the
concept of “breadth of appeal” can be introduced, to distinguish between popular and “niche”
programs. Berry and Waldfogel (1999a) empirically assess the classic problem of socially
inefficient market entry, in US regional radio markets. Berry and Waldfogel (1999b) adopt the same
approach to investigate the issue of spatial pre-emption as a market barrier.
Bourreau (2002) explicitly compares “mimicking” strategies in TV programming (equivalent to
1 He found that, if consumers have second-best alternatives, monopoly may be worse than competition, because of the
tendency of providing “common denominator” programs. Program variety may be too little.
2 They compare pay-TV with free, advertising based TV. They identify sources of market inefficiency in the two
cases.
3identical localization in the space of program characteristics) with counter-programming (maximal
differentiation), in the two regimes of pay-TV and advertising support. He founds that program
differentiation is maximal in the pay-TV, whereas mimicking may emerge in advertising supported
TV, but only if the cost of program quality is relatively high.
Anderson and Coate (2000, 2005) consider the possibility that the amount of advertising is freely
chosen by the broadcasting firms, assuming that there is a nuisance cost imposed on consumers by
advertising. These authors compare the social optimum with the market equilibrium, in the two
cases of pay-TV (or equivalent system, for other media) and free access with advertising support.
Under pay-TV, or equivalent regime, the market becomes two-sided, with negative network
externalities on one side (Roson (2005)).
An interesting aspect of these latter works is that the price of advertising services is explicitly
derived in terms of market equilibrium, instead of assuming, as it is generally done, that there exist
a fixed, exogenously given, unit revenue per viewer (listener, etc.). However, because of the
simplifying assumptions adopted in that model, a single price (per viewer) for advertising services
emerges. This implies that, in a free access system entirely based on advertising, maximizing
revenue means maximizing audience.
On the other hand, it is clear that actual markets for advertising services are much more complex
than that suggested by most media competition models.
3 Prices for advertising are not flat; rather,
various kinds of price discrimination mechanisms are usually at work. Also, customers of
advertising services in media like TV, radio, Internet, etc., are not simply interested in getting the
largest audience, but they are also interested in the type of audience. By doing so, they naturally
influences programming and scheduling, especially under a free access, advertising supported
regime. For example, in a recent report (Ofcom (2004)), it is stated:
In the market for TV advertising, advertisers purchase opportunities to present their products
to TV viewers from the commercial broadcasters, often through the use of intermediary
media buyers. Typically, advertisers will pay according to the number of impacts that are
achieved for their target audience (or, in some cases, expected number to be achieved),
and the price negotiations begin at the prices indicated on the relevant advertising ‘rate
card’, expressed as ‘cost per thousand’impacts. But the true price paid is determined
through negotiations that determine a discount on the rate card, considering many
factors (including deal size, share of expenditure on the channel, nature of the product
and timing of the advertisements).
(...)
The increasing number of channels is likely to result in lower average audiences per channel
(‘audience fragmentation’), which may adversely affect the value of advertising (advertisers
are thought to commonly prefer larger audiences as this helps to reduce duplication of
advertising impacts on the same individuals). On the other hand, more channels could
produce better audience segmentation (by defined audience type), that could actually
increase the value of advertising (as a defined audience group can be reached).
3 Bagwell (2003) provides a very comprehensive survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on advertising.
4Introducing a more realistic representation of advertising in media competition models is not easy,
as competition in media industries is already characterized by complex, multidimensional strategies.
Broadcasting channels, for example, compete in access prices (if possible), advertisement prices,
quality of programs, format and variety of programs, scheduling, etc. Capturing all these
dimensions in a single theoretical model is practically impossible.
Nonetheless, the basic nature of the demand for media services as derived from the demand for
advertising should explicitly be recognized: program content and advertising are complementary
services. In turn, advertising and goods in the final markets are also complementary.
The model we present in the next section can be regarded as a step in this direction.
4 Channel
competition is multidimensional: choice of format type within a discrete set of format alternatives,
horizontal differentiation within the format, quality choice. Consumers/viewers are not
homogeneous, and there exist a correlation between program type and audience composition,
influencing the willingness to pay of advertisers. Also, various kinds of price discrimination in the
market for advertising are taken into account.
3. The Model
3.1 Basic Setting
There are three types of agents in the model: “many” consumers, three advertisers and producers,
one or more broadcasters.
Consumers belong to three categories, differentiated on the basis of their program preferences and
consumption behavior. Just for illustrative purposes, let us call them “professionals” (P),
“housewives” (H) and “teenagers” (T). Each group contains a number i of individuals, each
one buying an average number of i units of a group-specific good, for example: professionals
buy computers, housewives buy hairdryers, and teenagers buy music CDs. However, all purchases
take place only if consumers get to know about the existence of goods on the market, which may
occur after viewing or listening an ad.
There is a single producer for each good, getting a unitary profit margin i (price – production
cost) Therefore, the “value” of market i is:
V i=iii (1)
Suppose that V PV HV T . Without loss of generality, normalize V H=1 , and assume that the
4 A model sharing the same perspective is in Dukes (2004). There are oligopolistic markets in media (advertising-
based) and products. Consumers are ideally located in two circumferences, for product and program types. There are
nuisance costs of advertising, but advertising is informative (consumers can access one product only if reached by
specific advertisement, diffused by some station). Other models model which paying explicit attention to the ability
to target advertising to specific groups of consumers are Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Chandra (2006).
5three markets are “equally spaced” in terms of value: V P=1, V T=1− . This is a
convenient hypothesis, which allow us to express the value spread in terms of a single parameter
(δ).
Broadcasters have perfect information. Therefore, they could fully extract the producers' rent, by
charging, for an advertisement of good type i in program j, up to:
pi
j=i
jV i (2)
where i
j is the share of i-consumers selecting program j.
Consumers may watch the TV, listen to the radio, or generally access a broadcasting media. This
access is free of charge, and there are no nuisance costs associated with the possible existence of
advertising. If more program types are available, each agent can choose to watch (listen, etc.) one
type of program. There are, at most, three program types. Merely for illustrative purposes, let us call
them “sport” (S), “comedy” (C) and “music” (M). Any channel can broadcast only one type of
programs.
5 All agents can also decide to undertake an alternative activity, providing an average
utility of μ.
An agent i selects the program type j, or the alternative activity, on the basis of the maximum
expected utility, U. If there are more channels broadcasting the same type of programs, one specific
channel is chosen, but only after selecting the program type. Individual utility is given by the sum
of two components: a “group” utility, u, based on expected utility, and an idiosyncratic component
ε i.i.d., accounting for individual differences within the same group of people:
U i
j=ui
ji
j (3)
Expected utility for the outside option is μ. Utility for a broadcast type j is given by the expected
quality of the programs, multiplied by a “correlation factor” γ. In turn, the perceived quality is
defined as the difference between “intrinsic” quality of the programs and a nuisance cost,
proportional to the number n of spots realized in the program:
ui
j=i
jq
j=i
j q
j−n (4)
The parameter γ expresses the tendency, for a particular group of people, of being “relatively more
attracted” by one specific type of programs. This factor is normally set to one, except when
professionals evaluate sport programs (i=P, j=S), or housewives evaluate comedies (i=H, j=C), or
teenagers evaluate music programs (i=T, j=M). In these cases, γ 1 ≥ . Therefore, although
individuals do make different choices, even within the same group, professionals tend to watch
sport programs relatively more than the rest, housewives tend to watch more comedies, and
teenagers tend to watch more music programs, ceteris paribus. This parameter plays an important
5 This does not mean that channels must have only one type of program (e.g., “all news”). This hypothesis could be
interpreted as focusing on one specific time segment (e.g., “prime time on Tuesday”).
6role in the model, in association with the parameter δ. The latter tells us how different, and
relatively important, consumers are from the viewpoint of advertisers. The parameter γ, on the other
hand, tells us how much correlation there is between program types and audience composition.
Therefore, for example, if sport programs are mostly seen by professionals, and professionals can
buy expensive
6 computers, an ad in a sport program will be valued more than an ad in a music
show, which is mostly seen by low-spending teenagers.
The probability for a program type of being selected is the probability that the associated utility U is
higher than the utility associated with alternative program types, or with the outside option. This
probability is increasing in the expected quality of the programs inside the class, and decreasing in
the quality of programs outside the class. Furthermore, since there are “many” agents in every
group, the probability can also be interpreted as the share of people, in each group, watching
programs of a particular type.
The specific form that this share function (Φ can take depends on the distribution of the parameter
ε. The obvious choice here is assuming that the distribution is exponential (Weibull-Gumble), so
that a logit expression is readily obtained:
i
j=
expi
jq
j
expexpi
jq
jexpi
kq
kexpi
lq
l
(5)
In the expression above, γ is 1 in two out of the three combinations, and the expected quality for a
category in which there are no broadcasting channels can be taken as “minus infinity” (a very high
negative number).
Channels are differentiated in three dimensions: type, intra-type horizontal differentiation and
vertical (quality) differentiation. Differentiation choices are the only competition strategies for
broadcasters, who aim at maximizing profits, obtained by selling advertising to producers of final
goods.
Inside each category of programs, both channels and consumers are ideally located in a circle of
unitary perimeter. Each “type” corresponds to a different circle and channels within the type are
located within each separate circle. Consumers discover their exact location only after selecting one
program type. All locations are equally probable ex-ante, meaning that consumers are
homogeneously distributed ex-post inside the circle.
If there is more than one channel for a type, a consumer chooses the channel providing the
maximum sub-utility w, expressed as the difference between program quality q (provided by
channel c in type j) and squared distance between the consumer and the channel in the circle (d) :
wi
j=max[qc
j−tdi−c
j 
2] (6)
6 It would be more correct to say “profitable” computers.
7where t is a “transport cost” parameter. Therefore:
q
j=Ewi
j=∫0
1
wi
j (7)
Quality is expensive to produce, and marginal costs are increasing in quality levels. In most of the
numerical examples shown later in the paper, it is assumed that marginal costs are linearly
increasing, with a unitary slope factor (quadratic costs).
Consumers, producers and broadcasters play a game, whose timing is as follows:
1. Broadcasters choose where to locate the channels they own, in terms of type, horizontal and
vertical differentiation.
7 The number of channels for all broadcasters is given.
8 If several
broadcasters are present, their choices are not coordinated, which means that this stage can
be interpreted as a Nash sub-game.
2. Consumers decide which program type to watch, or doing an alternative activity. Expected
utility of the programs by type is known. The latter also depends on the number of channels
available within each category.
3. Consumers discover their location in terms of intra-type preferences, and one channel is
finally chosen.
4. Broadcasters set prices for ad slots, and sell advertising services to producers.
5. Consumers buy goods, discovered through advertising, on the markets.
3.2 Preliminary Findings
This section establishes some results, which will be used later in the paper.
Lemma 1. Two independent channels maximize profits by locating the farthest away from each
other in the circle.
Proof. See Appendix. This result is standard in the literature, when applied to price competition and
convex “transport” costs in a circle.
Lemma 2. Expected utility for a program category, at given quality levels and with two channels, is
maximized when the channels are located the farthest away form each other in the circle.
Proof. Trivial. Direct consequence of convexity of sub-utility w in distance.
Lemma 3. The market area in the unitary circle, for a channel with quality q1 facing another channel
with quality q2≤q1+ t/4 is 2
1
4

q1−q2
t  .
7 Quality is set after location in the circle.
8 It could have been set by a market regulator beforehand.
8Proof. Assume, without lack of generality, that the first channel is located in zero and the second
one is located in ½. Solve for x, and multiply by two: q1t x
2=q2t1/2−x
2 .
Lemma 4. Expected/average utility for a program type in which one channel with quality q is active
is q – t/12.
Proof. Assume, without lack of generality, that the channel is located in zero. Compute
2∫0
1/2
q−t x
2dx .
Lemma 5. Expected/average utility for a program type in which one channel has quality q1 and a
second one has quality q2≤q1+ t/4 is:
q1−q2
2
t

q1q2
2
− t
48
. Therefore, if q1= q2=q, expected
utility is q-t/48.
Proof. Assume, without lack of generality, that the first channel is located in zero and the second
one is located in ½. Compute 2∫0
1/4q1−q 2/t
q1−t x
2dx2∫0
1/4q2−q1/t
q2−t x
2dx .
3.3 Case #1: Monopolistic broadcaster with one channel
Consider the case of a single broadcaster, owning one channel. What type of programs will this
channel show? If the broadcaster maximizes advertising revenue, this will be a sport channel, since
professionals have a tendency to watch sport programs, and having a larger share of professionals in
the audience can ensures higher profits in selling advertising spots.
However, some housewives and some teenagers will also watch the only available channel: this
could allow the realization of advertisement for hairdryers and CDs.
We can distinguish here between two regimes, depending on whether or not the monopolistic
broadcaster can implement price discrimination in the advertising market. Price discrimination
means that prices for ad spots can be different. Since profits indirectly obtained through advertising
are known, the broadcaster can charge up to P
S 1 for a computer spot, H
S 1 for a
hairdryer spot, T
S 1− for a CD spot. Producers surplus is fully extracted, and the broadcaster
profit coincides with the global social welfare, net of the consumers' utility of watching/listening
programs.
The broadcaster maximizes profit, which can be expressed as the difference between a revenue
function and a cost function. Under price discrimination, the revenue function is given by the sum
of products between audience levels and spot prices, for the three groups of viewers
9 :
9 An implicit assumption here is that the number of spots per program is unrestricted.
9Rq=
expq
expexpq
1 expq
expexpq
11− (8)
And, because of Lemma 4, if q1 is the quality of programs in channel 1, q = q1 - t/12.
If the broadcaster cannot price discriminate, she sets prices for ad spots, independently of their
content, but possibly proportional to the expected number of (relevant) viewers. Since the indirect
demand for advertising is discontinuous at the three levels of willingness to pay, there are three
options available for profit maximization:
1. Setting a high price ( i
j1 ). Only computer spots will be realized ( q= q− ), all
consumers watch the programs, but only professionals matter for the broadcaster.
2. Setting an intermediate price ( i
j1 ). Computer and hairdryer spots will be realized (
q= q−2 ). Professionals and housewives are equivalent from the point of view of the
broadcaster, who could decide to broadcast comedies instead of sport programs (the
audience composition would differ, not the broadcaster profit).
3. Setting a low price ( i
j1− ). All consumers are “served” ( q= q−3 ), and the
broadcaster could “locate”, indifferently, in any of the three program types.
The three revenue functions, corresponding to the three options above are:
R1q=
expq
expexpq
1 (9)
R2q=
expq
expexpq
 expq
expexpq
(10)
R3q=
expq
expexpq
1− expq
expexpq
21− (11)
Comparing the revenue functions (7)-(9) with the (6), allow us to derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Program quality, for a monopolistic broadcaster who does not price discriminate in
the market for advertising spots (and has increasing marginal costs), will be lower than the socially
optimal level of quality,
10 coinciding with the level chosen by a perfectly discriminating monopolist.
Proof. The three revenue functions (9)-(11) will always be lower than the revenue function (8), for
the same level of quality, and the marginal return of increased quality ∂R/∂q=∂ R/∂ q is also
lower. Consider an hypothetical starting point, in which quality is the same in the two regimes. A
profit maximizer would increase quality up to the point where marginal revenue equals marginal
costs. Because a non discriminating broadcaster does not fully internalize the marginal benefits of a
higher quality, optimal quality will be lower. In addition, identical quality, with different number of
spots (n=3 under discrimination, but n≤3 without discrimination) means that intrinsic quality is
10 Disregarding the consumers' utility of watching/listening programs.
10initially lower, already in the starting point. ∎
The upper rows of Table 1 illustrates the findings above with a numerical example, in which:
δ=0.5, γ 2 κ 0 μ     =1, t =1, and marginal costs are linearly increasing with slope one. The table
shows where the channel may be located, the advertising price, and the profit maximizing level of
program quality, in the four regimes. In this case, if price discrimination is not possible, the best
alternative is setting a unitary price for advertising, and broadcasting either sport or comedies.
Without price discrimination, some of the value of the advertisement is retained by the sellers. For
example, if the price for spots (per viewer) is one, then a profit of P
S  is retained by the
computer sellers. If the per-viewer price is 1-δ computer sellers retain P
S 2 , hairdryer sellers
retain H
S  . If sellers' profits are added to the broadcaster profit, total profits amount to 1.006 in
the first case, and to 1.085 in the second case This means that advertising prices are “too high”: a
special kind of double marginalization effect.
Table 1 – A numerical example of monopolistic broadcasting
11No. of Channels by Type Advertising Price by Type Program Quality by Ch. Profit
S C M S C M Ch1 Ch2 Ch3
1 0.5-1.5 1.005 1.254
1 1.5 0.733 0.593
1 (1) 1 (1) 0.732 0.719
1 (1) (1) 0.5 (0.5) (0.5) 0.475 0.463
1 1 0.5-1.5 0.5-1.5 0.814 0.575 1.601
1 1 (1) 1.5 1.5 (1.5) 0.653 0.127 0.743
1 1 1 1 0.499 0.499 0.982
1 1 (1) 0.5 0.5 (0.5) 0.294 0.294 0.668
1 1 1.5 1 0.541 0.530 0.895
2 0.5-1.5 0.552 0.552 1.046
2 1.5 0.366 0.366 0.501
2 (2) 1 (1) 0.355 0.355 0.631
2 (2) (2) 0.5 (0.5) (0.5) 0.221 0.221 0.438
1 1 1 0.5-1.5 0.5-1.5 0.5-1.5 0.714 0.425 0.248 1.767
1 1 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.568 0.089 0.089 0.842
1 1 1 1 1 1 0.393 0.393 0.123 1.112
1 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.208 0.208 0.208 0.798
1 1 1 1.5 1 0.5 0.465 0.432 0.134 0.959
1 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.415 0.415 0.123 1.034
3.4 Case #2: Monopolistic broadcaster with two channels
Consider now the case with two channels. Generalizing the reasoning above, it is natural to look
first at the situation in which the broadcaster can discriminate and decides to locate the two
channels in the first two program categories. Then, the revenue function, corresponding to (8)
would be:
RqS ,qC=
expqS
expexpqSexpqC

expqC
expexpqSexpqC1

expqC
expexpqCexpqS

expqS
expexpqCexpqS

expqS
expexpqSexpqC

expqC
expexpqSexpqC1−
(12)
Like in the previous case, qS = q1 – t/12 and qC = q2 – t/12.
Here, however, there is an alternative possibility. Both channels could also be located in one
12segment type. For the same reasons discussed above, if this happens, then the selected program type
must be “sport”. Increasing the number of channels in a category, for a given level of quality of the
programs, increases the intra-type differentiation and the expected quality of the type. Because of
Lemma 2, Lemma 5, and symmetry, qS = q1 – t/48 = q2 – t/48. Therefore, if it is important to attract
as many professionals as possible with sport programs (for example, because there is strong
correlation between consumer groups and program types, and professionals buy profitable goods),
then the monopolist could either (a) increase the quality q of the sport programs, or (b) increase the
number of sport channels.
In the example reported in Table 1, multiple sport channels generate less profits than two separate
channels, one for sport and the other one for comedies. This is not a general result, as the reverse
may occur if marginal costs of quality are higher, the premium δ on professionals is higher, the
correlation factor γ is higher, or the t parameter is higher.
Also, notice that the quality of sport programs with two channels is lower than the one with one
channel. This result is due to intra-brand competition, and it is similar to the case in which a multi-
product firm, selling substitutable goods, keeps prices higher than a single-product firm.
The other rows in the central part of Table 1 display the numerical results associated with the
regime of no price discrimination. Again, we can have three alternative price strategies (high,
intermediate, low), this time for the two cases of separate types or multi-channel type. Notice that:
• Quality is generally lower than in the case of price discrimination, for the same reason
pointed out in Proposition 1 (marginal revenue is lower, marginal benefits of higher quality
are not fully internalized);
• When the price for advertising is not high, there can be equivalent type locations for the
broadcaster, keeping the profit unchanged, but affecting the audience composition;
• With these parameter values, the maximum profit is achieved with intermediate prices for
advertising, in both cases (two types, one type with two channels);
• The lower the price for spots in the programs, the lower the quality of the programs. This is
again a consequence of lower marginal revenue.
In the middle of Table 1, a special case of indirect price discrimination is also considered. It is
assumed that the broadcaster charges different prices for advertising, not on the basis of the content
of the spots, but on the basis of the channel in which the spots are given. Of course, this strategy
makes sense only if the two channels are associated with different types, like sport and comedies.
Therefore, consider a situation in which spots on the sport channel are relatively expensive, they
deal only with computers, as the audience has a majority of professionals, and spots on the comedy
channel are cheaper, dealing with both hairdryers and computers, for an audience in which the
majority is housewives. In this numerical experiment, quality turns out to be higher, but profits turn
13out to be lower, than in the case of equal intermediate prices for advertising in both channels.
3.5 Case #3: Monopolistic broadcaster with three channels
Let us examine now the case with three channels, where we focus on the situation in which the
three channels broadcast different program types. Again, we distinguish between: perfect price
discrimination (based on advertisement content), no price discrimination (same price for
advertising, per viewer, independently of channel and content), and partial-indirect price
discrimination (different prices by channel). Results of the illustrative example are reported in the
bottom part of Table 1.
Results are in line with previous findings. In particular:
• Quality is lower without price discrimination, and decreasing in advertising prices;
• Indirect price discrimination is not superior to no price discrimination at all.
11
Furthermore, observe that total profits are increasing in the number of channels, although with
decreasing returns. This suggests that the model could be easily extended, for example by
introducing fixed costs, to cover the instance in which the number of channels is not pre-
determined, but it is optimally chosen (to maximize profits) by the monopolistic broadcaster.
3.6 Case #4: One channel for the incumbent broadcaster, one channel for a competitive entrant,
with different program types
Suppose that an entrant starts broadcasting with a new channel, with different type of programs, in
competition with a single-channel incumbent. Equivalently, a two-channels incumbent sells her
secondary channel to an entrant. The incumbent has a first mover advantage, meaning that she will
retain the sport channel, whereas the entrant will provide comedies.
Under price discrimination, the revenue functions for the incumbent and the entrant firms are,
respectively:
RIqS ,qC=
expqS
expexpqSexpqC1

expqS
expexpqCexpqS

expqS
expexpqSexpqC1−
(13)
11 This result is not general. In particular, it is due to the discontinuous nature of the demand curve for advertising.
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expqC
expexpqSexpqC1

expqC
expexpqCexpqS

expqC
expexpqSexpqC1−
(14)
Comparing (13) and (14) with (12), the following result can be readily established:
Proposition 2. Program quality in two channels, owned by independent operators, will be higher
than in the case of single ownership.
Proof. Notice that: RqS ,qC=RIqS ,qCREqS ,qC
RIqS ,qC
qS
0
RIqS ,qC
qC
0
REqS ,qC
qC
0
REqS ,qC
qS
0
So, market externalities are at work, and the marginal benefits of higher quality are greater than in
the case of monopolistic ownership. This result is perfectly analogous to the one bringing about
lower prices in competition, with differentiated products.∎
Also:
Proposition 3. Program quality in the entrant channel will be lower than the quality in the
incumbent channel, if price discrimination in the advertising market is possible.
Proof. Returns on quality are higher for the incumbent. To see this, switch qS with qC, and vice
versa, in the entrant revenue function (14), and compare with (13). For identical levels of quality,
revenue will be lower for the entrant. Marginal revenue, that is, the incentive to raise quality, will
be lower as well.∎
These findings are confirmed by the numerical results reported in Table 2. This table shows the
equilibrium levels of quality, and profits, obtained in the regimes of duopolistic competition, using
the same parameter values of Table 1. The scenario with two independent channels is considered in
the upper part of the table, for the two cases of perfect price discrimination and no discrimination,
with unitary price. Notice that the incumbent advantage vanishes without price discrimination, as
the two revenue functions would then be identical.
Table 2 – A numerical example of duopolistic broadcasting
15Ownership Advertising Price by Type Program Quality by Ch. Profit
S C M S C M Ch1 Ch2 Ch3 I E
I E 0.5-1.5 0.5-1.5 1.067 0.920 0.833 0.673
I E 1 1 0.694 0.694 0.473 0.473
I I E 0.5-1.5 0.5-1.5 0.5-1.5 0.868 0.528 0.633 1.199 0.486
I I E 1 1 1 0.476 0.476 0.293 0.777 0.314
3.7 Case #5: One channel for the incumbent broadcaster, one channel for a competitive entrant,
with the same program type
Of course, the entrant could also enter in the same program category in which the incumbent is
already operating. The potential advantage of doing so is that the entrant could benefit from acting
inside the richest segment, but the disadvantages are that (1) the sub-market has to be shared with
the incumbent, and (2) this will trigger intra-type quality competition.
By increasing the quality of the (sport) programs, a broadcaster increases the overall expected
quality of sport channels, but she will also gain more consumers within the sport segment. Inside
the segment, consumers are ideally located in a circle with unitary perimeter, homogeneously,
whereas the channels are located at two opposite locations (Lemma 1). If the channels provide
programs with the same quality, the market is equally split. If one channel provides higher quality
programs, her market area will be larger than one half, and dependent on the quality differential
(Lemma 3). If the quality differential is higher than t/4, a single channel gets the whole market.
Equilibrium in the sub-market can be described as a Nash equilibrium in a game of quality
competition. Figure 1 displays the reaction functions of the two firms in the program quality space.
If the competitor provides low-quality programs, it will be sufficient to provide the monopolistic
level of quality, since the market would then become monopolistic. If the competitor quality is
sufficiently high, a firm may want to provide higher quality levels, so as to attract more consumers
than the rival. If the marginal production cost of quality is not too high, and consumers can easily
switch from one channel too another (low differentiation in consumers' tastes), then a firm may be
willing to get the whole sub-market. This can be achieved by supplying quality t/4 higher than the
competitor.
12 Since the same reasoning can be applied to the other firm, the outcome is a “quality
race”, in which the two firms leapfrog each other in terms of quality levels. Eventually, since
marginal costs of quality are increasing, a firm may find not profitable to get the whole market, and
a Nash equilibrium could be found, in which the (symmetric) firms equally share the market with
12 Even higher quality is expensive to produce and brings no gains in terms of intra-type market area. It could attract
more external consumers toward sport programs, but this is not sufficient to justify the cost increase, as quality is
already above the monopolistic optimum.
16identical quality levels.
The problem with this candidate equilibrium (point N in Figure 1), is that profits may be negative.
This is the case for parameter values used in the numerical examples of Tables 1 and 2.
13 In Figure
1, two isoprofit curves are also drawn, representing the zero profit locus for the two firms.
Therefore, the parts of the reaction function above points Z1 or Z2 should not be considered: there
is no Nash equilibrium.
Figure 1 – Reaction functions for the quality competition sub-game
The lack of a Nash equilibrium refers to the case in which the decision of locating in the same
category of programs has already been taken. We can therefore interpret this result as suggesting
that broadcasters will never locate in the same segment, anticipating that quality competition would
be too tough.
This happens when marginal costs of quality are low, and/or consumers are little differentiated
inside a category of programs. In our numerical example, marginal costs are linearly increasing,
with a unitary slope factor. If this factor is increased to 10, an equilibrium exists with quality set at
0.225 and profits amounting to 0.246. Analogously, if the “transport cost” parameter t (representing
the degree of differentiation in consumers' tastes for sport programs) is increased from 1 to 4, an
equilibrium is found with quality at 1.203, and profits at 0.255.
3.8 Case #6: Two channels for the incumbent broadcaster, one channel for a competitive entrant,
with different program types
Let us consider a natural extension of the case of entry with different program types, analyzed
above. This time, however, the incumbent owns two channels (sport and comedy) and the entrant
13 Price discrimination in the advertising market is assumed.
17operates with the residual type (music). Results for the numerical example are reported in the
bottom part of Table 2.
Whereas the incumbent takes into account the cross-effects on profits of higher quality, between her
own channels, the entrant behaves competitively and disregards any negative effect of higher
quality on the competitor's profit. With price discrimination in advertising, there are incentives for
keeping quality high in those channels associated with high-spending consumers, but these
incentives are lower the greater the number of channels owned by the same firm. Combining these
two effects together, we can see that quality in the music channel may be higher than in the comedy
channel.
Quality will also be lower if broadcasters cannot price-discriminate. If an intermediate price is
chosen for ad spots, the incumbent will select the same quality level for her channels, higher that
that of the entrant.
4. Discussion and Model Extensions
Vertical and horizontal differentiation are competitive strategies in a broadcasting industry, based on
free access and advertising. The model illustrated in the previous section highlights how the
competitive game unfolds, under various scenarios of ownership and price discrimination in the
market for advertising services.
In the cases considered above, the ownership structure is given. This corresponds to a situation in
which market entry is controlled by a regulator. This regulator could, in principle, compare the
various equilibria, and choose an optimal market structure. This choice would then depend on a
number of critical factors: the amount and type of price discrimination in advertising, the
correlation between formats and audience composition, the relative profitability of the different
market segments, and diseconomies of scale in program quality.
The model could be extended, without major difficulties, to consider situations in which the number
of channels can be chosen by the operators, or the case of free entry with fixed costs (monopolistic
competition).
The model differs from most other models in the literature, because it provides a more realistic
representation of advertising, which allows focusing on the relationship between media markets and
advertising markets. Nonetheless, the modeling of advertising is still quite elementary.
For example, the existence of a single producer for each type of good was assumed, with full
information and homogeneity in consumer tastes. In this setting, the willingness to pay for
advertisement expresses the social value of advertising. As a consequence, a perfectly
discriminating broadcaster could fully appropriate the social surplus, and select the socially optimal
level of quality for the programs.
18The modeling of the advertising sub-market could be improved in a variety of ways, with possible
implications for the model results. A distinction could be drawn, for example, between informative,
persuasive, and complementary advertising (Bagwell (ibid.)). The introduction of multiple
producers and advertisers would also open up the possibility that the willingness to pay for
advertisement exceeds the social value of advertising, because of business stealing among
competing producers. In this case, the absence of price discrimination, preventing full expropriation
of the advertisers' willingness to pay by the broadcaster, could be socially beneficial.
Other model improvements could be easily devised on the media market. Even if the model
considers a relatively complex, multidimensional competition among channels, there are other
features which have been left out like, for instance, time scheduling. Perhaps the most important
aspect that could be considered is the possible non-independence of quality costs. Very often,
channels compete for limited resources: talents, “stars”, special events. This would imply that
quality costs depend on quality levels selected by other channels, competing or not.
5. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed, through a specific model: (i) the effects of price discrimination by
advertisers and (ii) the effects of audience composition on advertising profitability and the ability to
price discriminate. The link between between format choice and quality competition, on one hand,
and price discrimination and audience composition has been highlighted.
Quality and format choice depend on marginal surplus internalization. Price discrimination may
help broadcasters to get more marginal benefits of higher program quality, and this effect may be
especially important when consumers are heterogeneous in terms of (a) profitability, (b) correlation
between program type and audience composition.
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20Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Consumers are uniformly distributed in a circle with unitary perimeter. Without lack of generality,
assume that firm (channel) 1 is located at point zero, whereas firm 2 is located at distance x from the
first firm (measuring the distance clockwise, for example).
Consider a two-stage game in which firms decide upon location, and subsequently upon quality
levels. Consumers go to the firm providing the highest net utility, defined as a difference between
quality level and transport costs. We consider here quadratic transport costs, but the case can be
easily generalized.
Each firm, for example firm 2, is active on two sub-markets, to the left and to the right of her
location. The boundaries of the two market areas can be easily identified by considering the
marginal consumer, indifferent in her choice between the two firms. This allows us to state the
demand of firm 2, located in x and providing quality q2, when firm 1 provides quality q1, as:
D2q1 ,q2 ,x=1
2

q2−q1
2t x

q2−q1
2t1−x
(A1)
Profits of firm 2 are given by the difference between D2 and quality production costs. Taking as
given location x and competitor's quality q1, the optimal q2 is found by equating marginal revenue
(constant) with marginal cost (increasing, to satisfy the second order condition). If, for example,
production costs are quadratic ( Cq=cq
2/2 ), then:
q2
o= 1
2ct x1−x (A2)
Since the two firms are symmetric, they must end up doing the same choices. Therefore,
irrespective of the level of quality, the market is always equally split. The profit maximizing
location is the one which brings about the lowest quality in equilibrium. This is obtained by
maximizing the denominator of (A2), which gives x = ½, the result of maximal
distance/differentiation. ∎
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